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Abstract: If politics is about transforming ‘reality’, then think tanks are in the 
business of interpreting politics. However, there is a lack of research dealing 
with the way think tanks disseminate ideas. Although think tanks are publicly 
recognised, researchers face a number of difficulties in determining their exact 
impact on the policy process. As think tanks are mostly concerned with the 
climate of opinion, we aim to explore the ‘visibility’ and ‘activity’ of a 
comparable sample of three United Kingdom (UK) foreign policy think tanks, 
namely Chatham House, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and 
the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. These are 
ranked amongst the most influential ‘foreign affairs’ think tanks in the UK. 
‘Visibility’ signals the presence of think tanks on the Internet and in the media. 
‘Activity’ reflects the understanding of ‘the political’ as outcomes generated by 
their publications, and networking activities of their members and staff. For 
this purpose, we combine the usage of digital methods for ‘visibility aspects’, 
and elite methods for ‘activity aspects’ as a means to explore a possible 
reconceptualisation of ‘influence’ by encouraging the academic debate to 
approach this concept beyond the conventional quantitative and/or self-
referential inquiry. 
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1. Introduction 
In trying to define the concept, James (1993) noted three particular characteristics about 
think tanks. First, although being intellectually independent from governments, their 
output is geared by government needs. Second, they undertake public interest and 
strategic research. And, finally, most of them are politically aligned. We can add a 
fourth characteristic related to their purpose: think tanks are involved in the business of 
ideas; hence political parties are not the only actors attempting to shape ideology. 
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Ideology, a contested concept indeed, is revitalised in public debates, often transcending 
national boundaries, and is subject to abstract approaches, situational needs, structural 
crises, and election results. Opinions are transformed, replaced, and sometimes 
completely changed in a fiercely competitive political climate. In this process of 
crafting ideas, which has proven to be fluid and flexible, think tanks3 have become a 
prominent discussion partner in the political sphere. Along with other actors – for 
instance, interest groups, social movements, and intellectuals – think tanks seek to 
transform the perceived ‘reality’ by seeking authority of ideas purporting to political 
questions. Think tanks need to interpret the landscape of ideas in order to propagate 
their own impact in an ever-changing environment (Abelson, 2004). Albeit think tanks 
have become publicly recognised, the task of determining their exact influence in policy 
processes remains a major philosophical and methodological issue for researchers.  
 
In this article we attempt to explore two critical aspects that define the political strength 
of think tanks; namely, their ‘visibility’ and ‘activity’. We find that a promising 
approach to decipher the potential contribution of think tanks to politics is to examine 
their public recognition and the means they deploy to disseminate ideas. These two 
features will cover the visibility aspects of think tanks. Certainly, public recognition is a 
vague concept as well, at least to perform as a proxy for visibility. However, public 
recognition follows a straight-forward path so as to be operationalised as number of 
citations in newspapers and on various Internet platforms (Abelson, 1999, 2002). As 
discussed throughout the text, the variety in the intensity of these channels can be 
understood as preference for a certain channel for diffusion of ideas and interaction with 
the general pool. ‘Activity’, on the other hand, refers to the understanding of ‘the 
political’ as outputs generated by publications, in addition to networking activities of 
members and affiliated staff. To the extent that newspapers, academics and politicians 
make use of think tank material, it is an important variable in this study (McGann and 
Johnson, 2006). The interest in examining the activity of think tanks is to know their 
thematic priorities, their ability to obtain and generate resources, and their ability to 
penetrate areas of intellectual prestige. For palpable reasons, there are a number of 
issues that this article will not deal with. Perhaps the most significant issue we do not 
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examine is the actual influence of think tanks in public debates. The rationale for such a 
decision relates to not knowing ‘the power games’ – whether public or private – of the 
many actors involved in this process. There are many decisions that define power 
relations between the actors that are clearly unavailable to researchers. Since many 
decisions are made without providing information, researchers may overlook relevant 
information on a permanent basis. Thus there is always the possibility of being 
inaccurate in indicating the real influence of think tanks (Rich, 2004; ‘t Hart and 
Vromen, 2008).  
 
The difficulty of quantifying influence does not hide the aspiration of think tanks to 
influence policy framing, especially in foreign policy matters. This fact has been 
recognised by members of governments elsewhere. For instance, Richard Haass, 
Director of Policy and Planning, United States (US) Department of State (2002) pointed 
out the following: “Of the many influences on US foreign policy formulation, the role 
of think tanks is among the most important and least appreciated”. Whilst being aware 
of such methodological drawbacks, this article aims to contribute to the understanding 
of think tanks following the words of Evert A. Lindquist (1998: 127): “Despite the 
prominence of think tanks, most policy elites and citizens know relatively little about 
how they attempt to exercise influence, and how they manage to survive”. The study of 
the channels of influence of think tanks is based on the experiences of three think tanks 
in the UK, namely Chatham House, the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS), and the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies 
(RUSI).  
 
The article is structured as follows. First, we introduce a general debate concerning the 
use of ideas in politics, as well as a brief look at think tanks in the UK. Second, we 
highlight the main features of the selected think tanks. Third, we discuss the various 
forms that think tanks have followed to organise activities. Finally, we compare the 
visibility of think tanks in newspapers and social networks. 
 
2. The debate over ideas and the think-tank tradition in the UK  
 
2.1. The ‘reality’ of ideas and the idea of ‘reality’ 
Political Perspectives 2013, volume 7 (1), 46-74 
 
 49 
Two major issues in think tanks research relate to determining their influence on public 
policy (Abelson, 1999; Stone, 2004). Comprehensive attempts have been executed, such 
as that of McGann’s (2010) Global Go-To Think Tanks ranking. However, this effort 
and other studies have prompted a number of dubious methodological issues associated 
with the study of these particular fields, for example the high degree of self-referential 
data. To the extent that the influence, or impact, of think tanks in the policy process is 
defined by their very nature as actors generating ideas, it is necessary to define their 
contribution to the early stages of the political process – in the agenda-setting and the 
definition of public concerns – and also the latter stages of the political process; in other 
words, in the normative assessment of the results of government activities. It is 
important to note that the diffusion of social conflicts and political activity assessment 
are exercises embedded with great subjective connotation.  
 
This raises several questions about the political usage of reality. The ever-timely 
discussion over the analysis of ‘reality’, in any of its forms, is in permanent connection 
with the way that individuals and groups understand the world around them and the 
distribution of power that benefits or harms their interests. There is no real, objective 
social world existing detached from human minds, but imagined realities from which 
we are able to propose ideas and confront speeches (see Crotty, 2003). An example is 
Benedict Anderson’s definition of nations and nationalism as imagined communities 
(Anderson, 1983). In fact, normative debates doubt the existence of a common ‘reality’ 
insofar as it is socially constructed and varies depending on cultural structures and 
contextuality (see Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1984).  
 
This would pose a world where multiple realities, or ways of understanding the world, 
want to impose a complete rationality, perhaps exclusively. None of them is likely to be 
suppressed in democratic contexts where freedoms of individuals are recognised. 
However, the acceptance of competing realities does not mean that they all provide 
empirical-based ideas. Nor does it mean that there is a true reality, or that we are able to 
assign intellectual privileges to certain think tanks. One way to deal with these issues is 
to think that the right ideas are usually those that are accepted by the government. We 
can also take as a basis that the right ideas are those accepted by the majority of public 
opinion. However, these two statements do not provide a clear solution. As Grant 
(1985) suggests, there is a strong political component when it comes to categorising 
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social demands, interest groups and the like – including ideas – into ‘insider/outsider’ 
positions. From the perspective of governments, legitimate interests must have links 
with their political manifesto. For example, green ideas (environment) tend to have 
greater acceptance in leftist governments. Electoral swings become, therefore (and in an 
erroneous way) the principles that legitimise the ideas. This assertion stems from 
studies imparting that ideas are a strong means for social change, even though they must 
overcome many political and institutional filters over time. The history of social 
movements provides numerous examples. The answer to what ideas are the most 
appropriate is presumed impossible or, at least, incompatible with scientific neutrality, 
as long as these ideas do not contradict the basic principles of democracy. 
 
Therefore the inquiry into the notion of ‘influence’ is not one of objectivist ontology, 
nor of a positivist epistemology. Although propagating that there is a countable world 
“out there” (i.e. numbers of citations), we do not equate this to a fixed boundary 
concerning the meaning of a total sum (see Crotty, 2003; there are no contradictions 
between a realist ontology and constructionist epistemology). We build our arguments 
on this basis by assuming there can be alternative ‘realities’ and ways of interpreting 
our collected data, which effectively are aligned with the interpretivist underpinning of 
the study and above-mentioned research philosophical outlook. Lessons learned should 
relate to the contestable nature of ‘who speaks’ (for me) and, indeed, that the portrayed 
‘reality’ is socially constructed and the decision to display a particular ‘reality’ can 
indeed be politicised. Furthermore, the dynamic and ever-transforming relationality 
between the boundaries of different ‘realities’ call for alternative approaches to 
quantitatively measure influence of think tanks as an identifiable and static value.  
 
2.2. Think tanks in the UK: A brief outline 
The British ‘think tank’ tradition started with the ‘Philosophical Radicals’ in the 
eighteenth century. But it was not until the 1990s that the press heralded the salience of 
the so-called ‘think tanks of the New Right’ (Denham and Garnett, 1996). On the other 
side of the Atlantic, however, American scholars have devoted much more attention to 
such ‘thinking factories’ by considering them as essential for the functioning of both its 
political system and its democracy (Ahmad, 2008). It has been argued that the 
differences between Britain and the US in terms of the spread of think tanks can be 
ascribed to institutional, cultural, and political aspects, which benefit the latter “from a 
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tradition of corporate giving that is not apparent elsewhere” (Stone and Garnett, 1998: 
6; Sherrington, 2000). This is reinforced by an apparent privileged access to American 
decision-makers (Weiss, 1992). British think tanks, on the contrary, manage smaller 
budgets and recruit fewer staff, whereas their influence on governments’ initiatives can 
arguably be perceived as relatively moderate. 
  
Denham and Garnett suggest four stages to make sense of the evolution of think tanks 
in Britain. The utilitarians were the first group of people interested in pressuring the 
government by employing their writings and intellectual prestige. They served as a 
notable example for Auguste Comte’s positivist disciples, as well as for the Fabians 
who intended somehow to adjust liberalism’s fundaments. The second stage stemmed 
from the inter-war period. The devastating consequences of the First World War led to 
the establishment of think tanks concerned predominantly with the perils of a war 
revival. During the 1970s, several think tanks were formed (or transformed) to support 
Margaret Thatcher’s monetarist policies. They were chiefly ‘policy advocacy tanks’ in 
the sense of being “passionately committed and concerned only with providing 
arguments for those already half-persuaded” (Wallace, cited in Denham and Garnett, 
1998: 31). They perceived themselves as ‘universities without students’ (Hames and 
Feasy, 1994). Finally, Denham and his colleagues observed how the ideological 
reaction to Thatcherism encouraged the establishment of left-wing rivals to neoliberal 
think tanks. Accordingly, Pautz (2010) has documented the linkages between left-wing 
think tanks and the Labour Party. The Institute for Public Policy Research, the Social 
Market Foundation and Demos are examples of such left-wing think tanks. 
  
3. Foreign policy-oriented think tanks in the UK 
In this article we analyse three London-based foreign affairs think tanks, namely 
Chatham House, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and the Royal 
United Services Institute (RUSI). The identification of the most suitable think tanks 
within this policy field was based on the James McGann’s 2009 World Rankings of 
Think Tanks.4 It is an annual report sponsored by the ‘Think Tanks and Civil Societies 
Programme’ of the International Relations Programme at the University of 
Pennsylvania. The report “is the first comprehensive ranking of the world’s top think 
                                                     
4 We acknowledge that the methodology employed in compiling this ranking can be argued to be too self-
referential.  
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tanks, based on a worldwide survey of hundreds of scholars and experts” (McGann, 
2010: 5). The 2009 Top 50 World-wide Think Tanks (excluding the US) ranks Chatham 
House as the most influential think tank, ahead of Transparency International (2nd) and 
Amnesty International (5th). The two following British foreign affairs think tanks are 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which is placed in sixth position, 
and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), which is the 25th entry on the list.  
 
Both Table 1 and Figure 1 show some key characteristics of the think tanks. Generally 
the differences are quite remarkable in terms of staff. Chatham House happens to be 
better connected with the academic community and prone to attract academic experts to 
participate in its events and publications. We argue this to be a result of the higher 
numbers of academics and the usage of academic titles (for example, Associate Fellow 
Professor Shaun Breslin). Considering this, it can be expected that Chatham House is 
likely to perform strategic advising by taking advantage of the academic voices and 
networks (see Stone, 2007). Linkages with academics become a source of legitimacy 
and a resource for disseminating ideas to specialised academic communities. The other 
two think tanks have developed a different model by investing in satellite offices 
overseas. From the point of view of the benefits to members, having set up such offices 
generates other sorts of resources, for example, gaining access to first-hand information, 
influencing the implementation of foreign policies, getting involved in all types of 
networks abroad, and so forth. After showing a series of basic characteristics of the 
three think tanks, the following pages discuss in greater depth the organisational and 
leadership of each of the think tanks. As far as possible we make reference to the 
historicity and ideas that have been most important in defining their ideology. 
 
[TABLE 1 about here] 
[FIGURE 1 about here] 
 
3.1.Chatham House 
Chatham House is by far one of the most prestigious British think tanks both in the UK 
and overseas (Denham and Garnett, 1998a: 22). Its early establishment in 1920, as well 
as its public recognition thanks to its qualified publication service, which periodically 
launches scientific journals and academic works, has prompted Chatham House to 
become the model for other similar think tanks (Denham and Garnett, 1998b: 29). Also 
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known as the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), it was established 
following a desire first mooted by Lionel Curtis of promoting peace on the basis of a 
shared Anglo-American standpoint. After the Paris Peace Conference organised in 
1919, the British delegates begot the British Institute of International Affairs in London, 
whereas their American counterparts formed the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) in 
New York. According to the ideological mainstream of their times, both think tanks 
shared a set of beliefs based on liberal internationalism, institutional independence, 
‘Anglo-Saxonism’ elitism, Christianity, and non-partisanship in foreign affairs (Parmar, 
2004a, 2002).  
 
Back then, the government overtly opposed the attempt to build a ‘rival civil service’ 
(Higgott and Stone, 1994: 30). Hence during the 1930s the institute acquired public 
sponsorship, as well as strengthened its advising functions and research contributions 
(Wallace, 1994). Experiences since the Second World War onwards demonstrate 
Chatham House’s intimate closeness with the Foreign Office in assessing threats and 
priorities, whilst controversies are mainly concerned on “tactics, details, timing and 
emphases” (Parmar, 2004a: 105). With such statements in mind, it can be plausibly 
argued that Chatham House’s main commitments are: first, to mobilise public opinion 
by employing several means of consciousness such as academic journals, presence in 
the media, and expert events; second, to advise the government on strategic actions by 
anticipating future crises according to expert analysis; and, third, to permit its leaders to 
act as unofficial diplomats when the Foreign Office request its help (Parmar, 2004b). 
  
Chatham House relies on its non-partisan nature to defend its encompassing voice 
aimed at being representative of all UK-based parties. In its corporate message, it can be 
observed how Chatham House stresses to be an ‘independent international affairs think 
tank and membership organisation’. Her Majesty the Queen is the organisation’s patron, 
while well-known personalities from all parties such as Lord Ashdown, former Member 
of Parliament (MP) and Lib-Dem leader, Sir John Major, former Prime Minister (PM) 
and Tory leader, and Lord Robertson, former MP and Defence Secretary under New 
Labour’s government, are responsible for the presidency. As Lindquist points out, the 
intellectual reputation of an institute is ‘a critical resource when attempting to attract 
respected academics’. Members thus participate in institute affairs in a restricted way so 
as not to compromise the integrity of inquiry (Lindquist, 1993: 574). However, it may 
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be rather located “somewhere between the state and civil society, not quite the 
independent body that it claims to be and not a simple instrument of state power” 
(Parmar, 2004a: 167). These positions of responsibility ought to be understood as an 
attempt to expand its lobby capacity, to strengthen contacts with political parties, to gain 
better access to all institutional forums, and to capture more media presence.  
 
Furthermore, Chatham House explicitly refuses public funding, though Brewin (1992: 
122) argued ‘the choice of questions is closely tailored to perceived government needs 
and inhibited in posing unwelcome topics research’. In fact, while some governmental 
departments are among its members, ‘Chatham House often responds to requests from 
Downing Street to organise round table discussions among academic and political 
figures from countries where informal contact may be preferred to direct contact’ 
(Dickie, 1992: 298–9). Parmar (2004a) strongly insists about Chatham House’s elitist 
component by demonstrating the connections between the institute and representatives 
from sectors such as business, armed services, academia and politics from its early 
inception. In relation to this, Parmar (1992, 1995) also documents several outstanding 
donations made by big fortunes in the City of London and Wall Street in its origins and 
later on.  
 
3.2.International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
Sir Michael Howard, a British military historian, along with Denis Healey, Labour MP 
and Secretary of State of Defence (1964–70), and journalist Alastair Buchan formed the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 1958. The IISS emerged in 
response to the nuclear tension in the aftermath of the Cold War. International troubles 
such as ethnic conflict, political change, local arms control, and peacekeeping became, 
in this sense, central fields for its intellectual concern. As stated in its mission 
statement, the IISS has “five major goals: (1) provide objective information on military 
and political developments; (2) provide policy analysis over international peace and 
security; (3) convene government ministers, officials, international civil servants, 
independent analysts, business people and journalists; (4) enlarge an international 
network of influential and knowledgeable individuals, corporate entities, governments 
and other bodies; and (5) influence and promote the adoption of sound policies to 
maintain and further international peace and security and civilised international 
relations”. In this regard IISS appears to play a pragmatic political role by combining its 
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goal of influencing policy-makers along with local advisory task forces in “conflicts of 
all kinds in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East’ which have allowed the 
IISS to have ‘held conference in Costa Rica, Egypt, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Russia, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Zimbabwe … often in 
collaboration with local institutes and universities”.5 
 
The IISS openly exposes its budget structure as a way of deriving its institutional 
independence from its members’ reliability. The IISS offers different types of 
membership that permit different access to benefits and services. In fact, the institute 
was constituted as a company limited by guarantee and registered as a charity of which 
its executive committee members act as the charity’s trustees.6 IISS’ 2009 budget rose 
up to £7.7 million supported by fees and donations from international bodies, 
foundations, and individual members. Half of the budget expenditure goes to cover 
conferences costs (27%) and operations (23%), whereas other minor contributions are 
associated with the library (3%), publications (8%), interest expenses (8%), indirect 
funded expenditure (12%), and directly funded expenditure (19%). The basic 
membership category welcomes students to consult the library and be selective for IISS 
events. The executive corporate membership is the highest category allowing 
corporations to participate actively in IISS events, as well as to use restricted databases 
and consultancy services. All of them receive a set of IISS publications including 
journals (Survival), monographs (Adelphi Papers), annual surveys and inventory 
(Strategic Survey, The Military Balance), and regular briefings (Strategic Comments). 
The institute assures it represents 2,500 individual members and 450 corporate and 
institutional members from more than 100 countries. 
 
3.3.Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI)  
The Duke of Wellington founded the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and 
Security Studies (RUSI) in 1831, making it the oldest defence and security think tank in 
the whole world. Its promoters’ commitment, including Commander Henry Jones and 
the Duke of Clarence, was to establish a professional, scientific institution, rather than a 
club. This was an attempt to include military affairs in scientific circles, raising their 
                                                     
5 This is an excerpt from comment raised by the IISS in the presentation of its history on its website. This 
can be found at: http://www.iiss.org/about-us/history/ (Retrieved 05/01/2011). 
6 See the 2007 Memorandum of Association of the International Institute for Strategic Studies for more 
information about the IISS statutory features.   
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level of importance for the life of citizens. Therefore there was a necessity to attract 
relevant military professionals into the executive bodies: Sir Howard Douglas, a leading 
expert on naval gunnery, became the first director of the Institute. Bidwell (1991: 70–1) 
comments that:  
 
[t]he intellectual drive would depend on the imagination and liberty to freely express 
their ideas of the ordinary members. To this end the founders were politically astute 
enough to invite thirty of the most distinguished officers of the day to become vice-
presidents, but they also perceived that the future of the institution would depend on 
attracting as many of the youngest and most junior officers as possible. 
 
In its inception and according to the war procedures of the epoch, the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies was mainly concerned with military and naval issues. 
Today, however, it covers “vital policy issues to both domestic and global audiences” 
by specialising in the analysis and discussion of “developments in military doctrine, 
defence management and defence procurement”. RUSI’s six major conferences indicate 
concerns relating to land forces, maritime security, air power perspectives, C4ISTAR 
(Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target 
Acquisition and Reconnaissance), critical national infrastructure and ballistic missile 
defence. Moreover, RUSI’s publications enjoy a high recognition among professionals 
and international relations (IR) scholars. For instance, the RUSI journal, founded in 
1857, is one of the leading journals covering international relations topics, along with 
other monographs series and policy papers such as RUSI Defence Systems, RUSI 
Monitor, Whitehall Papers, and Whitehall Reports.  
 
RUSI aims to organise high-level events as a means to bring academics, policy-makers, 
officials and businesspeople closer together. The short distance between RUSI’s central 
Whitehall location and the Ministry of Defence and parliament partly accommodate for 
such an endeavour. Contrary to other think tanks, RUSI is committed to transparency 
even when it comes to its ‘established client list, which includes the Ministry of 
Defence (UK), the Department of Defence (US), the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (UK), the State Department (US), the European Union and a large number of 
international defence and security companies (see RUSI Corporate Brochure: 5). The 
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contribution of these official bodies to RUSI’s financial maintenance through 
commissioned research initiatives is remarkable. 
 
As proof of its reputation in British military circles, several media echoed the decision 
of former US President George W. Bush to only deliver a speech at an event co-hosted 
by RUSI in November 2003, ignoring the requests to attend parliament. During recent 
years, RUSI’s members have witnessed speeches delivered by US General David H. 
Petraeus, Ambassador Mark Sedwill, and Liam Fox (UK Secretary of State for 
Defence). Furthermore, international expansion is among its latest strategies. Since 
2007 RUSI has established satellite offices in Qatar and in the US in order to strengthen 
its global connections. As RUSI points out, ‘the launch of RUSI (Qatar) is part of the 
institute’s strategy to expand its defence and security research activities to key regions 
of the world’.7 In other words, the opening of offices in the US and Qatar reflects main 
areas of conflict (the Middle East) and influence (US) of British foreign policy in the 
early twenty-first century.  
 
4. Activities, topics and reputation 
The aim of think tanks is to push governments towards a certain ideological direction. 
Ideology-related objectives are complex and pose temporary challenges. There is the 
challenge of influencing the overall direction of government policy, but there is also the 
need to influence specific decisions taken every day. The activities of think tanks 
attempt, thus, a dual function: to share daily concerns with decision-makers as well as 
spreading slogans through media. The way of analysing think tanks’ contributions to the 
political debate is therefore manifold. Since many of the daily contacts are private, 
publications published by think tanks are a remarkable way to grasp the efforts of these 
kinds of actors to form opinions. One of the values of the publications is their proactive 
or reactive nature, being sensitive to government proposals or launching new proposals. 
In this sense, think tanks publish a wide range of publications, from books to 
newsletters. Organising events proves to be a useful way to convene members and 
experts under one roof whilst seeking media coverage.  
 
                                                     
7 Extract from RUSI’s website. This refers to the reasons for establishing an office in Qatar. The text can 
be found at: http://www.rusiqatar.org/about_us.php (last accessed 05/01/2011). 
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Here the analysis is mainly based on events, journals, and publications for the period 
2005–10. To begin with, we have documented the events into eight categories according 
to topics. Categories fall within an activity or a region (see Table 2). On the one hand, 
three categories were created to differentiate between issues relating to security and 
terrorism, economy and governance, and climate change. These three areas are 
particularly different from each other; items are grouped into: weaponry and military 
strategy (security and terrorism); economic crisis and government (economy and 
governance); and energy crises and climate (climate change). On the other hand, five 
categories account for issues related to five geopolitical areas in international relations. 
The first stands for United Nations (UN) affairs and the United States. The transatlantic 
issues and Latin America are included in this category, although they are 
proportionately small. The second category includes matters related to Russia and Asia; 
for example, politics in China and Russia, the emerging countries of the region, the state 
of democracy, and so on. The third category numbers events in Europe, the European 
Union and the United Kingdom, while the fourth category deals with events featuring 
themes with a focus on African countries. The last category focuses on a geographical 
area of particular importance in the last decade: the Middle East, including the conflicts 
in Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Israel, Qatar, Pakistan, and so forth. 
 
[TABLE 2 about here] 
 
Data indicate three general trends regarding think tanks’ topics. First, three topics are 
covered by most think tanks, namely security and terrorism; the Middle East; and 
Russia/Asia. This is to a greater extent congruent with the government’s policy 
priorities in the foreign realm. For instance, permanent references to Terrorism and 
Afghanistan could be found in UK government’s national strategies such as A Strong 
Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy and Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office’s Business Plan 2011–2015. References to China and Russia are 
also frequent in the government agenda as well. 
 
Second, Chatham House focuses on a larger number of topics in comparison with IISS 
and RUSI. Chatham House shows special interest in economy, climate change, and 
Africa. This allows Chatham House to forge a discourse not merely based on military 
issues, allowing a more heterogeneous membership base. Finally, IISS shows little 
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concern about UK and European issues. This reinforces the idea that the IISS seeks a 
membership different from other think tanks.  
 
Reputation is an interesting point. One way of assessing reputation is by observing how 
prestigious the people invited to events are. For instance, referring to 2009 events, 
Chatham House was able to schedule talks from a large list of professors, researchers, 
MPs, ministers, Her Majesty’s (HM) ambassadors, military, foreign presidents, 
international organisations’ staff, business executives, non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) directors, and journalists. To name a very few, there were contributions from 
academics coming from prestigious universities (Oxford, Manchester, Warwick, 
Toronto, Leipzig, Sheffield); high representatives from the United Kingdom, United 
States, Denmark, Brazil, Lithuania, Hungary, and Namibia; staff from Human Rights 
Watch and Amnesty International; as well as newspaper correspondents from Die Zeit, 
Newsweek, and Financial Times. The IISS was also prominent in inviting experts and 
decision-makers such as Gordon Brown, David Miliband, and Asif Ali Zardari. RUSI 
shows a similar capability for organising events attended by experts. Overall, no big 
differences can be highlighted in terms of reputation. Perhaps Chatham House shows a 
larger network of contacts due to its extensive events programme, which reflects a 
higher number of resources indeed. 
  
In fact, resources do matter, especially in funding a vigorous publishing service. Tables 
3, 4 and 5 illustrate think tanks’ publishing strategies. Chatham House provides a higher 
number of publications including two academic journals, summaries and briefing 
papers. On the contrary, the IISS is not particularly interested in supplying a large 
amount of publications. IISS has devoted special efforts in updating its ‘Armed Conflict 
Database’ and ‘Strategic Survey’, rather than focusing on competing with other think 
tanks’ journals. Indeed, IISS’ recruitment logic seems to be more focused on holding 
specialised summits (Global Strategic Review, the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Manama 
Dialogue, the Bahrain Global Forum, the India Global Forum, and the IISS-JIIA Tokyo 
Conference). Finally, RUSI is less ambitious than Chatham House, but remains fairly 
constant in the publication of its RUSI journal and the RUSI Newsbrief.  
 
[TABLE 3 about here] 
[TABLE 4 about here] 
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[TABLE 5 about here] 
 
5. Public visibility 
As a notion of power, the concept of visibility indicates quite accurately the public 
recognition of a given actor by considering that any grouping purporting to influence 
the government will fail unless its name appears in the media on a regular basis. 
Visibility becomes, therefore, a core ambition for think tanks. In this respect, “much of 
the important work in lobbying is in setting the agenda, in defining the alternatives for 
decision-makers, in gathering evidence, and in convincing others that certain types of 
evidence are germane to the decision at hand” (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998: 37–8). 
Think tanks want newspapers to echo their proposals to create the impression that some 
particular ideas they defend do really matter. Moreover, the impact of the Internet in 
politics is undeniable (Chadwick and Howard, 2008; Coleman and Blumler, 2009). That 
is also the case with the growing salience of blogs, Google, and YouTube as means of 
interacting politically. According to this, there is some practical interest in observing the 
think tanks’ Internet visibility as well. 
 
First, this paper explores visibility in terms of newspapers’ citations. On the one hand, 
citations have been collected from 11 UK newspapers for the period 2005–10 (Table 6). 
On the other hand, we have gathered citations from newspapers all around the World, 
including UK newspapers (Table 7 and Figure 2). Table 6 depicts that Chatham House 
is the most cited think tank in UK newspapers, followed by the RUSI and the IISS. A 
more detailed analysis suggests that Chatham House’s prominence is due to the 
frequency of its events. In general, newspapers echo key results in surveys, press 
releases, and speeches. They tend to warn of dangers associated with terrorism, the war 
in Iraq, the Middle East conflict, the situation of British troops abroad, and the role of 
government in international forums. Regarding ideological bias, data does not confirm 
any striking conclusion. Newspapers, whether conservative (for example, The Times, 
The Daily Telegraph) or liberal (such as The Guardian, The Independent), publish 
pieces of news from Chatham House in similar shares. The Guardian, a liberal 
newspaper, highlights the activity of RUSI, but The Independent, which is also a liberal 
newspaper, opts for limited coverage. The Times and The Guardian, probably the two 
British newspapers with higher prestige, mainly quote the IISS. Table 7 evidences that 
the IISS has less coverage in the international arena than Chatham House and RUSI, if 
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we take into account British newspapers.  However, the number of citations of IISS 
increases if we only analyse foreign newspapers. In this case RUSI loses international 
prestige, while Chatham House remains the think tank with better access to international 
newspapers. 
 
[TABLE 6 about here] 
[TABLE 7 about here] 
[FIGURE 2 about here] 
 
Second, Table 8 shows the Internet visibility of Chatham House, the IISS and the RUSI 
in comparison with other UK, US, and European think tanks. The inclusion of think 
tanks follows McGann’s 2009 list. The list has no thematic exclusion. Motivation for 
exclusion related to scarce presence on Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. This is the 
case for, for instance, the French Institute of International Relations (France), the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sweden), and the Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik (Germany). Three comments may be noted: first, public policy 
think tanks have more followers and therefore more visibility. This gives them more 
opportunities to spread their messages. They are better able to raise awareness about 
sensitive issues by issuing crude campaigns to support, say, minorities. Second, 
Chatham House, the IISS and the RUSI’s visibility on the Internet is very modest in 
comparative terms. Chatham House manages to be as visible as other American think 
tanks, but not as much visibility as the Council of Foreign Relations. And, third, one 
might think that such small presence on the Internet may well be caused by a rational, 
voluntary argument. Think tanks aiming to craft ideas on such contested issues as 
security and defence would be likely to avoid conflicting messages. They would rather 
prefer a much more elaborated debate in private events. In fact, think tanks have 
considerably increased the number of events in recent years. Considering an opposite 
point of view, the limited public dissemination of debates and opinions on sensitive 
issues can generate a democratic deficit. Getting opinions of think tanks could only be 
achieved through affiliation. This leads to deeper discussions about elitism in decision-
making and citizen control of political activity. 
 
[TABLE 8 about here] 
 




This article has dealt with the challenging issue of think tanks’ involvement in the 
political process. We have discussed theoretically the limitations related to the use of 
ideas in politics, as well as consistently presented the main characteristics and historical 
evolution of three major think tanks that are part of the network of actors focused on 
UK foreign policy and world affairs. After raising serious doubts about the 
quantification of the influence think tanks can exert on the government, we have chosen 
to focus the analysis on two aspects (‘visibility’ and ‘activity’). In concert, these facets 
can, somehow, capture a consistent picture of the channels to exercise influence in the 
field of promotion and creation of ideas. Despite these methodological difficulties 
‘influence’ is likely to remain one of the core topics in think tank research, and indeed 
for think tanks during their everyday activities. Influence, as decision-makers point out, 
is a key resource for think tanks. This section has shown that the way in which such 
influence is exerted varies from case to case. Chatham House defends its reputation as a 
less political invested and research-based venue. In this particular case, Chatham House 
relies on an ample research branch including a large academic collaboration. In so 
doing, Chatham House can be labelled as a ‘research institute’ which aims to shake the 
government’s opinion. In terms of prestige, think tank scholars have broadly perceived 
Chatham House as the most influential institution, and our data confirm such a stance.  
 
However, we should not forget the increasing salience of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS). The IISS is less committed to public research than to convene 
well-known experts to discuss over specialised issues. This is a resource to attract new 
members looking for specific information in a non-academic format. 
 
At this point, we challenge a critical dilemma: what is it that makes an influential think 
tank? Hybrid models as the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) seem likely to fail to 
be leaders in any field, whereas models designed to enhance network or either academic 
collaborators (Chatham House) or experts (IISS) are better able to concentrate efforts 
and resources and, therefore, be more effective. However, this statement is simple 
enough to lose explanatory strength. Other factors should be considered, such as the 
government’s willingness to promote think tanks, showing friendly approaches, good 
performance of the leaders in penetrating the bureaucracy and generating political 
capital among officials, the typology of the think tanks’ members and their demands, 
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and so forth. Because many questions remain unanswered, future research may be 
conducted as a multi-method study where new qualitative empirical data are collected. 
A wider selection of cases can benefit future research endeavours. It would be 
interesting to examine think tanks with different backgrounds and ideologies. And 
above all, future research should deal with the following question: do they employ 
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Table 1. Think tanks’ basic facts 
 Established Location Staff 
Main Other Researchers Others 
Chatham House 1920 London - 165 62 
International Institute for 
Strategic Studies 




Royal United Services 
Institute 
1831 London Qatar 
U.S. 
77 24 
Source: Selected think thanks’ portfolios as mentioned in: 
Chatham House: http://www.chathamhouse.org/ 
IISS: http://www.iiss.org/ 
RUSI: http://www.rusi.org/ 















































2005 12 16 1 9 9 15 6 22 90 
2006 15 19 5 20 17 12 12 20 120 
2007 24 17 12 18 36 26 23 32 188 
2008 28 47 15 26 83 26 40 40 305 
2009 28 42 27 22 82 44 48 51 344 



















2005 8 0 2 5 16 0 1 19 51 
2006 24 0 0 9 18 6 1 28 86 
2007 19 1 0 15 24 2 2 28 91 
2008 17 0 0 10 36 8 3 19 93 
2009 25 1 7 16 35 9 0 27 120 
2010 40 3 7 13 26 10 3 33 135 
 
RUSI 



















2005 20 1 0 5 0 16 1 4 47 
2006 19 0 0 8 2 21 4 3 57 
2007 26 1 3 15 6 18 4 12 85 
2008 23 2 3 5 8 20 6 17 84 
2009 21 0 2 10 3 18 3 16 73 
2010 42 1 1 1 5 19 2 10 81 
Source: Selected think thanks’ events archives available online at: 
Chatham House: http://www.chathamhouse.org/events 
IISS: http://www.iiss.org/events-calendar/ 
RUSI: http://www.rusi.org/Events 



















2005 4  1 7 10  1  4  
2006 4  1 7 10  -  4  
2007 4  1 8 10  -  4  
2008 4  1 8 10  1  6  
2009 4  1 5 10  1  6  
2010 4 1 6 12 1 6 
Source: Chatham House’s publications archive 
Available online at http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications  
(Last time acceded 05/01/2011) 















2005  4  1 7 10  1  4  
2006  4  1 7 10  -  4  
2007  4  1 8 10  -  4  
2008  4  1 8 10  1  6  
2009  4  1 5 10  1  6  
2010 4 1 6 12 1 6 
Source: IISS’ publications archive 
Available online at http://www.iiss.org/publications/  
(Last time acceded 05/01/2011) 
Table 5. RUSI’ main publications (2005-2010) 












2005  12  3  10  2  n/a  6  n/a  
2006  12  3  10  2  3  6  n/a  
2007  12  3  10  -  6  6  n/a  
2008  12  3  10  3  2  6  4  
2009  9  3  4  3  1  6  1  
2010 6 3 1 2 2 6 1 
Source: RUSI’s document archive 
Available online at http://www.rusi.org/publications/  
(Last time acceded 05/01/2011) 







Table 6. Think tanks’ UK newspapers’ citations (2005-2010) 
Newspaper C. House IISS RUSI 
The Times  186 95 108 
The Guardian  116 102 141 
The Evening 
Standard  
24 6 35 
Daily Telegraph  109 45 91 
The Observer  51 5 23 
The Independent  157 34 46 
Daily Express  23 6 33 
Daily Mail  53 15 49 
The Sun  7 11 23 
Daily Mirror  32 8 30 
Sunday Times  52 20 35 
Total citations 810 347 614 
Source: referenced newspapers’ news archives 
Table 7. Think tanks’ major World-wide newspapers citations (2005-2010)  
Chatham House  IISS  RUSI  
Newspaper  Citations  Newspaper  Citations  Newspaper  Citations  
Times (UK)  186  Guardian (UK)  102  Guardian (UK)  141  
Independent (UK)  157  Times (UK)  95  Times (UK)  108  
Guardian (UK)  116  Straits Times  87  Daily Telegraph (UK)  91  
Daily Telegraph (UK)  109  New York Times  52  Daily Mail (UK)  49  
Christian Science 
Monitor  
93  Inter. Herald Tribune  47  Independent (UK)  46  
The Australian  78  Daily Telegraph (UK)  45  Evening Standard (UK)  35  
Daily Mail (UK)  53  Christian Science 
Monitor  
38  Sunday Times (UK)  35  
Sunday Times (UK)  52  The Australian  37  Herald - Glasgow (UK)  31  
Observer (UK)  51  Independent (UK)  34  Scotsman (UK)  31  
New Zealand Herald  39  Washington Post  31  Daily Express (UK) 33 
Daily Mirror (UK)  32 Washington Times  30  Daily Mirror (UK)  30  
Total citations 966 Total citations 598 Total citations 630 
Source: referenced newspapers’ news archives 
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Table 8. Think Tanks’ Internet Visibility (as of January 2011) 







Chatham House  UK  IR  6,569 228,405 21,289 
IISS  UK  IR  154 72,733 10,715 
RUSI  UK  IR  4,594 42,038 5,894 
Amnesty International  UK  Human Rights  57,750 2,956,807 54,928 
Adam Smith Institute  UK  Economy/ Public 
policy 
6,127 86,479 9,909 
Brookings Institution  US  Economy/ Public 
policy  
13,188 178,936 13,572 
Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace  
US  IR  8,485 72,211 13,348 
Council of Foreign Relations  US  IR  40,612 581,345 41,209 
RAND Corporation  US  Public policy 7,465 21,280 11,848 
Heritage Foundation  US  Public policy  421,706 2,956,134 186,307 
Center for Strategic and 
International Studies  
US  IR  63,124 124,155 2,448 
Cato Institute  US  Public policy  113,236 1,826,119 128,781 
International Crisis Group  Belgium  IR  14,946 10,572 23,969 
Centre for European Policy 
Studies  
Belgium  European issues  1,383 7,375 - 
Bertelsmann Stiftung  Germany  Public policy  1,789 743,736 1,899 
Fraser Institute  Canada  Public policy  2,448 172,267 8,133 





















Figure 1. Think tanks’ staff and researchers (as of January 2011) 
 
Source: Think tanks’ staff portfolios available online at: 
Chatham House: http://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/staff 
IISS: http://www.iiss.org/about-us/staffexpertise/ 
RUSI: http://www.rusi.org/about/staff/ 
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Figure 2. Think tanks’ newspapers’ citations (as of January 2011) 
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